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. . . even a lone particle has an associated wave as a 
flow that defines the coexisting space of its presences.
(D+G 1984:280)
Connectionist networks are intricate systems of simple
units which dynamically adapt to their environments.
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen 1991:21)
"To be strung out" is a phrase most often associated with drug
addiction and then again with reference, mainly, to the so-called
"hard" drugs like crack or heroin. In order to be "strung out", we
must exhibit at least two different properties: we must have totally
subsumed ourselves to the pursuit of a drug induced high; and we
must be almost continually high, or "fucked" to use another
common phrase. This brings to mind Judge Schreber caught rigid
in a million divine threads, like prey stuck fast in a spider's web,
yet different insofar as these miraculous rays from God are
penetrating him literally, for Schreber, fucking him up. We have
an image of Judge Schreber strung out on God's web not merely a
worldwide web, but an infinite, universal web in receipt of God's
spunk like so much celestial smack, delivering him into
schizophrenia. And within this web Schreber's body empties,
disconnects, fills-up and reconnects according to a bizarre and
convoluted schema.
The co-ordinating system used by the schizo is as unlike the
familiar Cartesian system as we could imagine. Any schizo
decoding is a fluidification of our ordinary systems of
organization. The fluid, strung out Schreber can adopt multiple
positions within his system of schizo geometry: he can become
woman, he can become a politician, he can become parent and
child, dead and alive, which is to say, he is situated wherever
there is a singularity, in all the series and in all the branches
marked by a singular point, because he is himself this distance
that transforms him into a woman, and at its terminal point he is
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already the mother of a new humanity and can finally die. (D+G
1984:77)
At each singularity, at each point where all the divine rays
converge forcing him deep into a schizophrenic gravity-well,
Schreber's subjectivity is radically and unalterably reconfigured.
The spacetime of the schizo is radically unfamiliar to us. In
cosmological theory, matter entering the event horizon of a
singularity undergoes "spaghettification" the subjective
consequences of this strung-out stuff must be the
schizophrenization of D+G: Dn par excellence.
To be strung out is to undergo the constant destruction and
reappraisal of individual subjectivity; whether "really", in terms
of drug involvement, or "virtually", as this characterization of
Schreber could be termed. (We should remember, however, that
both of these forms of "becoming-strung-out" operate according
to different impulses, or follow different vectors, or perform
different functions; for example, we could characterize drug
dependency in DeleuzoGuattarian terms as a function of the
process: Tn?>Dn?>Rn; whereas Schreber's schizo becoming-
strung-out is more of a Dn.) Furthermore, becoming-strung-out,
the fluidification of social coding and the dissolution of traditional
co-ordinate geometry all relate to operations on what D+G call the
plane of consistency; they must, therefore, also be related to what,
in Capitalism & Schizophrenia 2. A Thousand Plateaus, D+G call
the principle of multiplicity. And once we get into multiplicities,
well, anything can happen....
Already we have here a jumble of concepts as convoluted as any
schizo's paranoiac system. The link I want to make in what
follows, thereby mapping this jumble, is between "becoming-
strung-out" and contemporary techno/cyber culture, with special
emphasis upon our notions of subjectivity. The question of art
will follow these mappings.
Emergence
To talk of "emergent properties" or "emergent behaviour" seems
to be philosophically de rigeur at the moment. Emergence appears
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to refer to two historically different, but currently connected, as
we will see, concepts. The first is contained within Chaos Theory
and can be summed up in the phrase, "the spontaneous emergence
of order out of chaos" (DeLanda 1991:229). In the terms favoured
by such a theory, emergence describes the transition from one
type of behaviour to another, a phase transition, or even a
bifurcation event. To this we can add, again from Manuel
DeLanda: "Roughly, we could say that phenomena of self-
organization occur whenever a bifurcation takes place: when a
new attractor appears on the phase portrait of a system, or when
the system's attractors mutate in kind" (Crary 1992:138). A kind
of change which happens without any outside input.
The second predates contemporary Chaos Theory, finding many
of its theoretical elucidations in the 1920s; Kevin Kelly explains
in his 1994 book, Out of Control. The New Biology of Machines:
"The emergent step, though it may seem more or less saltatory [a
leap], is best regarded as a qualitative change of direction, or
turning point, in the course of events," writes [C. Lloyd] Morgan
in Emergent Evolution [1923] . . . (Kelly 1994:15). And the Web-
published essay "The Concept of Emergence" provides a
contemporary (elenchic) critique of Professor Stephen Pepper's
(1926) critical essay "Emergence". (Pepper's essay criticizes the
notion of emergence for its epiphenomenalism, the dualistic
doctrine that consciousness is merely a by-product of
physiological processes and has no power to affect them. (Collins
English Dictionary). Indeed, epiphenomenalism may seem to be
very similar to some of the ideas propounded by many
contemporary theorists of consciousness-as-emergent. Though
this is not the place to provide another critique of
epiphenomenalism, I think that in what follows we shall not find
any advocation of dualism.) Kelly characterizes these theories (or
versions of the theory) thus: "In the logic of emergence, 2 + 2 =
apples" (loc. cit.). According to these notions, emergence relates
to a philosophical "becoming". 
In its current usage, a usage inseparable from the theories of
Chaos & Complexity the concept of emergence is bound up
within the myriad architectonics of Connectionism. Kevin Kelly
writes the following, "[Daniel] Dennett is slowly persuading
many psychologists that consciousness is an emergent
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phenomenon arising from the distributed network of many feeble,
unconscious circuits" (Kelly 1994:54). And as soon as we hear the
invocation of the "distributed network", we know we are in
Connectionist territory. In Sadie Plant's "The virtual complexity
of culture" (Plant 1996:203-17), the term "connectionism" has
swarmed from the specificities of Computer & Cognitive Science
to infiltrate a general cultural arena; indeed, Plant's work can also
be seen as influencing such an infiltration. The import of the
connectionist model, for her, goes beyond purely postmodern
liberalism (as Sherry Turkle characterizes the non-technical use of
conectionist metaphorics). A connectionist approach, for Plant, is
one which has a strong DeleuzoGuattarian political impetus.
Unlike traditional serial processing, Connectionism does not
propose the linear hierarchy of information. Rather, it endeavours
to connect all its parts to each other (parts that have been called
"demons" in some systems, or "agents" in the early Perceptron
system), it lets relationships form where links are strong in an
effort to let the multiplicity "learn" from its "experience". What
happens within the Connectionist arena is that information is not
skimmed from the top of a hierarchic processing of pieces, but
emerges from the entire machine working in concert. Turkle
explains, albeit mystically: "Unlike information processing AI . . .
the conectionists did not see information as being stored
anywhere in particular. Rather, it was inherent everywhere. The
system's information, like information in the brain, would be
evoked rather than found" (Turkle 1996:132). Plant is somewhat
less spiritual when she writes of the equation of intelligence with
the workings of the Connectionist Machine:
What is now described as an "order-emerging-out-of-massive-
connections" approach defines intelligence as an exploratory
process, which learns and learns to learn for itself. Intelligence is
no longer monopolized, imposed or given by some external,
transcendent, and implicitly superior source which hands down
what it knows or rather what it is willing to share but instead
evolves as an emergent process, engineering itself from the
bottom up. (Plant 1996:204)
Plant shows that the Connectionist approach, especially as it is
informed by the philosophy of D+G (both separately and
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combined), is emancipatory rather than oppressive. 
Now we can see re-emerging some of the ideas outlined in the
opening section of this paper. On one level, at its most
fundamental, Connectionism provides for a multiplicitous
approach to processing; in which case, the whole idea of
"processing" goes out the window, for it loses the notion of a
step-by-step, process towards a goal (information, intelligence . . .
) and favours something approaching a swarm. A multiply
connected "processing" swarm bears a remarkable resemblance to
a strung-out Judge Schreber. We remember Schreber penetrated
by a myriad celestial rays, his subjectivity multiplied & infected
with a mutagen which enhances hiw powers of becoming. He is
connected & through these connectins all his bodily organizations
are dissolved. Schreber ceased - long before Freud's textual
encounter with him - to be limited, or defined by the boundaries
offered by his body. Thus an easy answer to D+G's question:
"How do you make yourself a Body without Organs?" could be,
"Get Connected."
Plant shows that the workings of Connectionism are not only
theoretically and functionally valid within a singular discipline,
but should be allowed to flow across disciplines too. In terms of
the human (rather than the transcendental workings of theory),
however, such an approach has a profound impact. Connections
can happen across species "barriers", across material "barriers" as
well as across conceptual "barriers".
Subjectivity, Art, Culture
As a response to problems posed by the desire to infect machines
with something approaching human-like intelligence,
Connectionism seems currently very successful. There is an added
irony in that the feedback-like re-mapping of human
consciousness through Connectionism's approach to machinic
intelligence has also been insightful. I have already mentioned the
assertion (from Dennet via Kelly) that consciousness is an
emergent property. Sherry Turkle notes that connectionism has
had important ramifications for ego psychology too:
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For [psychoanalyst David] Olds, connectionism challenges ego
psychology by providing a way to see the ego not as a central
authority but as an emergent system. Through a connectionist
lens, says Olds, the ego can be recast as a distributed system.
Consciousness can be seen as a technical device by which the
brain represents its own workings to itself. (Turkle 1996:140)
The similarities between such a statement as this and the
subjective concerns of - for example - Hume (personal identity as
a jumble of perceptions), Kant (the subject as both a synthetic
construct & a construct of synthesis) and even Nietzsche (the "I"
as nothing other than a grammatical exigency), I think are
remarkable. The individual subject, the ego, can no longer be seen
as the fundamental basis upon which everything else can be built.
It is not an Ursprung from a special point of mystical origin, but
rather, emerges from the necessary affects, and capacities for
being affected, of bodies. 
Once we follow Plant's advice and pursue connections beyond
their disciplinary boundaries, we may have to rethink our notions
of the construction of subjectivity too. Once subjectivity is seen as
emerging out of the complex and chaotic machinations of neural
networks, then the attachment of these neural nets (Haraway's
"biotic information processing systems") to other networks must
radically alter the ways in which subjectivity is constructed. (It is
interesting to remember that in his "Regimes, Pathways,
Subjects", Guattari characterizes machines as "hyperdeveloped
and hyperconcentrated forms of certain aspects of human
subjectivity" [Crary 1992:18]. Before we are even materially
connected to our technological offspring, Guattari shows that we
are theoretically and psychologically connected to them.) Just as
Judge Schreber felt himself to be strung-out on, and
multiplicitously fucked by a network of divine threads, his body
emptied of its organs and their workings spread out on a universal
scale around him, to be connected and reconnected at will; so we
may be seen - especially with the growing emergence of the
Internet, some would say - to be strung-out upon a network of
inter-connected systems. The stuff of subjectivity swarms ever
more chaotically. And individuality seems to be an ever more
redundant and oppressive notion within this vast distributed,
dynamic network. 
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Subjectivity does not represent the only way in which the
concepts of emergence and connectionism relate to contemporary
cultural concerns. In fact the very notion of "culture" itself can be
regarded as an emergent property of widely connected
phenomena-as Plant shows in the following, long passage:
Connectionist conceptions of the cultural do not merely operate
within the parameters of a humanist discourse of individuals and
societies, but they collapse distinctions between human life,
natural life and the artificial lives of economies, on-line libraries
and complex systems of every kind. Cultures are parallel
distributed processes, functioning without some transcendent
guide or the governing role of their agencies. There is no
privileged scale: global and molecular cultures cut through the
middle grounds of states, societies, members and things. There is
nothing exclusively human about it: culture emerges from the
complex interactions of media, organisms, weather patterns,
ecosystems, thought patterns, cities, discourses, fashions,
populations, brains, markets, dance nights and bacterial
exchanges. There are eco-systems under your fingernails. You
live in cultures and cultures live in you. They are everything and
the kitchen sink. (Plant 1996:214)
Thus we are presented with subjectivity and culture as emerging
from similar (if not the same) material. For Deleuze - following
Spinoza - the body is described in terms of speeds and
slownesses, capacities for affecting and being affected (see Crary
1992:625-33); he writes: "We call longitude of a body the set of
relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest, between
particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between
unformed elements. We call latitude the set of affects that occupy
a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an
anonymous force (force for existing, capacity for being affected).
In this way we construct a map of the body." (Crary 1992:629).
Taking this Spinozistic perspective, we can see that these
subjectivities & cultures are defined according to the same
material. Once all our connections are materialized and desired,
the multiplicitous flows constitutive of our subjectivities will be
able to ooze, to proliferate. Distinctions and differences will breed
and be fleeting as connections are grown & lost, weighted &
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ignored at will. What will emerge from this pullulating mass of
stuff? this soup of organs, chemical & digital information,
software, hardware & wetware? I dunno...but I can't wait to find
out.
Final Remarks relating to Art
How, then, do we relate all this to the question of Art? Or, rather,
can all of this not be related to Art? I have already quoted Guattari
as saying that machines are "hyperdeveloped and
hyperconcentrated forms of certain aspects of human
subjectivity", can this not also be true of art? As emergent and
interconnected as any other cultural practice. And in this respect,
does it matter just how such stuff emerges from the network of
machines-subjectivities-cultures &c? (We should not forget that
the word "technology" comes from techne and logos; and that
techne relates to art, skill & craft, in all their possible definitions.)
Once we are attuned to the importance of Connectionism, to
subjectivity and culture as emergent, to the role of art in
promoting such connections and emergences, then the way in
which such art is produced, surely, becomes unimportant.
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